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to describe the added value of the SIEM use case and its technical details. The objective 
was to create a novel construct that could be utilized in developing and managing SIEM 
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life and trying to produce a novel construct to solve these problems. The produced 
construct was implemented, and the achieved results were analyzed with qualitative 
means. A set of interviews was held with the involved parties to get a wider view of the 
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By utilizing the SIEM use case concepts and with the proposed construct, answers to the 
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Tiivistelmä  
Vallitsevassa kyberturvallisuuden uhkatilanteessa organisaatioille on tärkeää ylläpitää 
reaaliaikaista kybertilannekuvaa, kyetäkseen havaitsemaan heidän ympäristöönsä kohdis-
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havainnointiin ja niihin reagoimiseen. SIEM (Security Information & Event Management) 
on yksi näistä järjestelmistä, jota voidaan hyödyntää kybertilannekuvan tuottamisessa ja 
tapahtumien havainnoimisessa. 
Kybertilannekuvaa ja kyberturvallisuuden tappoketjuja tutkittiin SIEM-järjestelmän kyvyk-
kyyksien kehittämisen näkökulmasta. Yksi tärkeimmistä käsitteistä oli SIEM-käyttötapaus, 
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mästä noussutta ongelmaa. Ongelman ratkaisemiseksi muodostettiin konstruktio SIEM-
käyttötapausten elinkaaresta ja hallinnasta. Ehdotettu ratkaisu toteutettiin käytännössä ja 
saavutettuja tuloksia arvioitiin laadullisesti. Haastattelujen avulla kerättiin kokemuksia 
ehdotetun konstruktion toteutukseen ja jalkautukseen osallistuneilta henkilöiltä, sekä 
saavutettiin tulosten arviointi laajemmasta näkökulmasta. 
SIEM-käyttötapausten konseptin ja muodostetun konstruktion avulla saatiin vastauksia 
asetettuihin tutkimuskysymyksiin, sekä todettiin kuvatun konstruktion tuovan kaivattua 
rakennetta ja menetelmiä SIEM-käyttötapausten muodostamiseen ja hallintaan. 
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Glossary 
MSSP   Managed Security Services Provider 
NCSC-FI  National Cyber Security Center Finland 
SOC  Security Operations Center 
SA  Situational Awareness 
APT   Advanced Persistent Threat 
CKC  Cyber Security Kill Chain 
IR   Incident Response 
Zero-Day exploit Previously undisclosed exploit with no fix or update 
available 
UKC  The Unified Kill Chain 
MO  Modus Operandi  
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1 Introduction 
In the modern IT threat landscape the ability to produce up to date and relevant 
cyber security situational awareness (SA) is crucial for organizations in order for them 
to be able to detect and respond to the ever-growing amount of threat actors and ill 
activities taking place in their environments and this way to ensure their business 
continuity. Continuous development of cyber security threat landscape forces 
organizations to implement new tools and techniques constantly to detect and 
mitigate ongoing cyber events and security incidents. 
In their 2019 Internet Security Threat Report Symantec stated that cyber criminals 
use living of the land technique and supply chain attacks more often while 
conducting attacks. Symantec has also seen a rise in targeted attacks utilizing above 
techniques and therefore these types of attacks pose a serious risk to organizations. 
Living of the land technique means utilizing built-in features of operating systems 
and off-the-shelf tools, and in supply chain attacks third-party services and software 
are exploited to gain access to a final target. According to Symantec, these types of 
attacks need advanced detection methods such as analytics and machine learning. 
(Symantec 2019, 17-18) 
As many organizations outsource their IT infrastructure management, some 
organizations also outsource parts of the situational awareness creation to managed 
security services provider (MSSP) and to their security operations center (SOC). This 
makes forming and creating situational awareness of the cyber security events in the 
customer environments crucial for MSSP SOC services. 
Cyber SA is typically formed by an SOC analyst by utilizing the output of multiple 
technical systems and external sources, e.g. NCSC-FI information sharing 
communities. Security information and event management (SIEM) system is one of 
these systems that aims to help SOC analysts in creating situational awareness. SIEM 
technology has been around for a substantially long time and as it is closing on the 20 
years mark it is also closing the Plateau of Productivity stage on Gartners “Hype Cycle 
for Threat-Facing Technologies, 2018” (Shoard 2018). 
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The understanding of how attacks take place in the modern ICT environments makes 
it possible to detect the attacks and defend against them (Pols 2017, 9). An SOC 
analyst can utilize cyber security kill chain (CKC) models while forming cyber SA to be 
able to better comprehend the chain of actions taken place previously and to project 
the possible future actions taken by adversaries. Events presented in CKC phases can 
also be utilized when presenting this information to associated personnel, e.g. for a 
customer representative responsible for decision making.  
This thesis is assigned by Istekki Oy. Istekki is an ICMT company providing ICT and 
medical technology services for its customers which are also its owners. As a part of 
these services there are Cybersecurity consultant and situational awareness services.  
2 Research 
2.1 Research objectives and framework 
In this thesis, the creation of cyber security situational awareness and cyber security 
kill chains are studied from the perspective of SIEM system and SIEM use cases. 
For every organization it is important to have the ability to detect and respond to 
cyber security incidents. Therefore, each organization needs to have cyber security 
situational awareness (SA), and SIEM system is an essential system in creating this 
cyber SA. While forming SA, the SOC analyst receives and processes SIEM system 
outputs. Each SIEM system output for the SOC analyst is based on specific reasons 
why that output was provided and what kind of threat that output could indicate. 
These reasons form the SIEM use case. After an SOC analyst has formed SA and 
detected the incident, it is possible to start cyber security incident management 
processes. 
In this thesis the SIEM use case is the main concept. The SIEM use case includes the 
description of the threat that it responds to and the specific technology components 
and logic used to accomplish that objective, including the needed information 
requirements. The SIEM use case describes how the information is used to create 
and maintain cyber SA. As an output the SIEM use case can use alerts, reports or 
dashboards depending on the use case objective and operation logic. SIEM use case 
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is more specific than the general cyber security business use case or the goals set for 
security monitoring. Many SIEM vendor documents and other publicly available 
documents only describe the general security monitoring use case’s which needs to 
be further refined into a SIEM use case. 
The objective of this thesis is to form and propose a construct that is used for 
developing new SIEM use cases and to manage SIEM use cases throughout their 
lifecycle. This proposed construct should help security specialists in developing SIEM 
use cases that are relevant to the customer organizations’ threat and risk 
management objectives and provide actionable and relevant output that help to 
create the cyber SA and a way to manage these SIEM use cases throughout their life 
cycle. In order to target SIEM use case development to the most important areas, a 
way to visualize and assess the capabilities provided by the SIEM system and a way 
to detect potential blind spots in detection capability is needed. 
This thesis research does not seek to build new SIEM use cases, but to find and 
create ways to help develop and manage them and to assess the visibility those SIEM 
use cases provide, i.e. how the SIEM use case aims to improve cyber SA. Additionally, 
this thesis does not seek to find out initial reasons and justification for SIEM 
deployment or how to choose the right SIEM system platform. 
2.2 Research methodology 
It is typical for constructive research approach that the researcher’s empirical 
intervention is explicit and strong, and the ideal outcome of constructive research is 
that a real-life problem is solved with a new implemented construction (Lukka 2001).  
The main elements of the constructive research approach are practical relevance, 
practical functioning, theory connection and theoretical contribution. Figure 1. 
presents the four core elements of constructive research approach (Hyötyläinen, 
Häkkinen & Uusitalo 2014, 4; Lukka 2001). The constructive research approach starts 
by acquiring an in depth understanding of the research object both in theory and 
practice. The theoretical research is what differentiates constructive research from a 
consulting project. (Lukka 2001)  
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Figure 1. Constructive research approach 
This research starts by defining the problem at hand and acquiring research papers 
and other theoretical information related to the subject and studying available 
methods and constructs used for solving similar kind of problems, e.g. cyber security 
kill chain and SIEM use case development methods. Figure 2. provides a schematic 
overview of the research approach and thesis process. 
 
Figure 2. Schematic overview of the thesis process 
The initial version of the proposed construct is created by combining the acquired 
theory knowledge and experience gathered through previous work experience and 
SIEM deployments. The proposed construct is further developed by iterating and 
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developing its pieces while creating SIEM use cases and developing SIEM capabilities 
with the team responsible for managing and developing the SIEM system.  
After the proposed construct is finished, it is utilized and tested by creating SIEM use 
cases to customer environments and measuring its success by analyzing it against the 
objectives set for this thesis.  
This analysis is carried out by interviewing people related to the SIEM and situational 
awareness by using theme interview method. Qualitative evaluation is conducted for 
the results of the interviews and researchers’ personal experiences to assess the 
proposed solution and compare the acquired results with the objectives set for the 
thesis. In the theme interview the researcher discusses with the interviewee about 
beforehand defined topics or themes (Puustinen 2013, 5).   
The theory connection and theoretical contribution are discussed in the theoretical 
part and the results section when analyzing the results. The practical relevance is 
demonstrated in chapters 3 & 4 and practical functioning in chapter 5. 
The problem to be solved in this thesis emerges from the work life tribulations of 
creating SIEM use cases that provide effective situational awareness; hence, 
constructive research approach was chosen to be used in this thesis research. 
Lukka (2001) describes that the risks included in the use of constructive research 
approach are research subjects and the high relevance of the findings to the 
employer’s business, which could be too delicate to be published. Additionally, there 
is a risk that the research subject organization’s commitment will not hold (Lukka 
2001). These risks are recognized and accounted in the thesis process by 
concentrating more on the general problem than on the environments and processes 
of the employers and customers.  
2.3 Research questions 
Multiple studies and research articles can be found on cyber security kill chain, cyber 
security situational awareness and SIEM systems; however; only limited information 
could be found describing the ways to utilize these models and concepts together in 
practice, while trying to achieve better situational awareness and visibility into cyber 
security events by utilizing SIEM use cases from technical and practical standpoint.  
9 
 
 
To assist in defining the thesis contents and constraints and to structure this thesis, 
the following main research questions were set. 
• How could the available frameworks, methods and tools be utilized to 
improve SIEM capabilities? 
• How can cyber security kill chain models be used to create SIEM use cases? 
Additionally, the following three sub research questions were set to further guide the 
process: 
• How can organizations’ risk and threat management information be used to 
guide in technical SIEM use case development? 
• What are the most important requirements for creating new SIEM use cases?  
• How could the visibility provided by the SIEM use cases be analyzed to 
recognize potential blind spots and assess the need for development of new 
use cases? 
3 SIEM system as basis for situational awareness 
3.1 Cyber security situational awareness 
Situational awareness (SA) has been studied extensively in many applications, and it 
is also getting more popular in cyber security domain, where it is called cyber 
situational awareness (cyber SA) (Onwubiko 2016, 2). 
An operator’s SA is crucial to decision making, and as the complexity and dynamics of 
the environments increase, acquiring and maintaining SA becomes more difficult. 
Endsley (1995, 34) states that “Situation awareness, as such, incorporates an 
operator’s understanding of the situation as a whole, forming a basis for decision 
making”. 
In the original SA model proposed by Endsley, SA consists of three aspects which are 
Perception, Comprehension and Projection. Perception aspect of the SA means 
awareness of the current situation with respect to time. Comprehension means 
understanding of the current situation, consequences, impact, changes in the 
situations over time, and possibly what could have caused it. Final SA aspect 
projection means estimation of the changes in the current state, and what could 
become of the impending situation if not controlled in time, and prediction of 
possible evolution of the current to impending situation. (Endsley 1995, 36-37) 
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A simple example of SA is a car driver who wants to know about obstacles in the way 
and to take these observations in to consideration to avoid colliding into them. To 
help the driver in forming SA, many modern cars have sensors to track the proximity 
of objects around the car. 
Cyber security environments are very complex and contain many aspects with 
challenging and dynamic states. Therefore, up to date SA is needed for informed 
decision making. Cyber SA is similar to applications of SA in air traffic control or 
ground military operations. (Onwubiko 2016, 5) 
Onwubiko (2016, 6) summarizes Cyber SA as follows:   
In summary, Cyber SA encompasses people (operator/team), 
process and technology required to gain awareness of 
historic,current and impending (future) situations in cyber, the 
comprehension of such situations, and using those understandings 
to estimate how current situations may change, and through those 
predict future situations and the resolution of the current situation, 
and the enablement of controls to protect the systems from future 
projected incidents. 
Endsley originally described three levels (L1-L3) of SA, and McGuinness and Foy 
extended this to include resolution as the level four (L4). In relation to Cyber SA, 
Onwubiko states that perception (Level 1) is related to evidence gathering of cyber 
situations. Comprehension (Level 2) is related to understanding the situation by 
analysing the evidence gathered and the events observed in cyber situation 
combined with threat and risk level and identification of attack types. Projection 
(Level 3) means forecasting the future situations or states by understanding the ways 
current state could escalate. Resolution (Level 4) is related to controls that could be 
used to repair, recover, remedy and resolve the conceived situation. Figure 3 
represents these SA levels. (Onwubiko 2016, 7-9). 
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Figure 3. Cyber SA levels 
While Cyber SA exists on different levels, these levels depend on the underlying 
layer; Level 2 could not be acquired without level 1, i.e. the current and future 
situation could not be projected if the situation is not perceived (logs of events 
received) and comprehended (operator analysis done by aggregating and correlating 
events) (Onwubiko 2016, 10-11). 
In his paper “Understanding Cyber Situation Awareness”, Onwubiko proposed a 
Cyber SA Instantiation Model which is an overlay of the modified Endsley’s process 
model. It enables the use of situation awareness process model when building new 
Cyber SA applications or assessing existing implementations. This model is shown in 
Figure 4. (Onwubiko 2016, 12). 
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Figure 4. Cyber SA instantiation model 
In Cyber SA instantiation model, there are five broad sources that provide 
information for SA creation. The first sources are classified as information generating 
sources and classified as L0. These are systems that provide logs of their operation 
and are targets of an attack, compromise or exploitation. These systems are not able 
to detect an attack by themselves unless there is some other mechanism built into 
them, e.g. Windows desktop computer with antivirus system installed. The logs 
provided by these information generating sources could contain pieces of evidence 
of an attack. (Onwubiko 2016, 12-13) 
On L1 there are four sources that provide information for SA. These sources are 
protection enforcing sources, vulnerability and threat intelligence gathering sources, 
tracking and external intel. These L0 and L1 information sources feed information to 
a collection mechanism that is used to make this information available to L2 
Comprehend stage, where different information is used to fully understand the 
situation. To help form level 2 SA, information could be fused and correlated to help 
understand and process it and therefore provide enhanced SA. The analysis of 
information collected should be continuous real-time process and even possibly 
automated. The collected information could be conflicting, or some parts could be 
missing; therefore, the analysis techniques must be such that they can take this into 
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account. Onwubiko (2016, 13-15) states that “Finally, analysis is meaningless if its 
outcome cannot be interpreted and well understood”. 
On Projection (L3) level, understanding of the current situation created in L2 is used 
to form possible outcomes and what can be done to influence to the outcome. 
Resolution (L4) focuses on steps needed to remedy, recover and resolve the 
situations and achieving this resolution includes processes and functions to triage, 
classify, prioritize and investigate situations. (Onwubiko 2016, 16)  
Human factors affect the quality and performance of the formed SA. Attributes that 
affect this are skills, experience, abilities and training. Additionally, enviromental, 
workload and stress factors affect the individual’s performance. (Onwubiko 2016, 8)  
Studies show that when team members understand that SA is lacking information, 
they perform better than the teams thinking they have all needed information 
(Endsley 1995, 39-40). 
3.2 Security Information and Event Management - SIEM 
Security Information and Event management (SIEM) systems have been used for a 
long time in IT, and as the technology has evolved into more mature it is ready to be 
implemented by more and more organizations (Shoard 2018; Miller, Harris, Harper, 
Vandyke & Blask  2011). SIEM system is a collection of technologies designed to 
provide insight into events taking place in cyber security environment. SIEM system 
combines the Security Information Management (SIM) and Security Event 
Management (SEM) systems. (Miller et al. 2011, Introduction) 
SIEM systems are designed to be used by security professionals and analysts to 
monitor security posture of IT environments and respond to security events. SIEM 
system uses alerts, dashboards and reports to deliver information for the SIEM users. 
It can detect security events by correlating events from different sources. Reduction 
of false positives is one important objective for SIEM systems, which is accomplished 
by correlating events. Correlating means to relate events to each other, e.g. 
correlating IDS alert information with Windows AD login events to detect user behind 
these actions. (Miller et al. 2011, Introduction) 
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Miller et al. (2011, Regulatory Compliance) state that for successful SIEM system 
deployment an organization needs to recognize its assets and consider the 
organization’s risk and threat management information. SIEM can help the 
organization to protect all aspects of Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability, which 
is also known as CIA triangle (Frye 2010, 15) 
To successfully be able to tie SIEM system usage to current threat landscape SIEM 
use cases need to be defined. These use cases define in what kind of events SIEM 
system is used to detect and what is the logic behind them. The risk and threat 
management processes of an organizations should be used to guide the selection of 
SIEM use cases to ensure efficient resource usage of SIEM systems (personnel and 
compute/storage). (Miller et al. 2011, Threat Models; Frye 2010, 8;) SIEM use case 
can be used to describe SIEM correlation alerts, monitoring dashboards and reports.  
In his blog post Andre Hohner (2019) states the following about importance of SIEM 
use cases:  
Without tangible use cases, the data in any SIEM would only be 
stored in a structured manner, enabling ex-post investigation if 
necessary – but near real-time monitoring of security-relevant 
parameters is a long way off.  
Generally, a SIEM system consists of collection layer, parsing and normalization layer, 
correlation and rule engine, log/data storage, information presentation layer and 
event management. The main building blocks of a SIEM system are presented in 
Figure 5. (Miller et al. 2011, chapter 5) 
 
Figure 5. SIEM system building blocks 
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SIEM systems can utilize many different sources of information including Windows 
and Linux workstations and servers’ events, firewall logs, IDS/IPS device alerts, 
network flow data and databases (Miller et al. 2011, The Anatomy of a SIEM). The 
information collected using different means is then parsed and normalized before 
indexing and storing into the database for searching and long-term storage. Rule and 
correlation engine go through the information with predefined rules to find the 
security events and then alerts the user. A SIEM user can also search through the 
information to perform additional searches by using graphical user interface, which is 
typically a web interface. (Logpoint Administrator training 2018) 
3.3 SIEM as information source for Cyber SA 
As stated in the previous chapter, a SIEM system collects information from different 
sources, combines, correlates, and enriches it for the analyst to consume and to 
understand. From this information and based on the previous paragraphs it can be 
deduced that a SIEM system works mainly in the Cyber SA levels 1-2 (perceive and 
comprehend) but it also could be developed to provide guidance and understanding 
on level 3 (projection) by tying events and alerts to predefined threat scenarios. This 
should be one of the guiding principles in the SIEM system design and use case 
development. 
Lötjönen (2017, 37) stated in his thesis that “cyber security and its situational 
awareness is much more than just a technical issue”. This means that not one 
technical system could solve the creation of SA; however, technology and 
automation can help the persons responsible for creating cyber SA perform more 
efficiently and make decisions in more timely manner.  
Information needs for different roles in Cyber security management differ as they are 
needed in order to make decisions on different level (Lötjönen 2017, 37), e.g. in 
MSSP SOC and a hospital customer case, the SOC analyst consumes information 
received from different technical systems to detect possible cyber security events, 
predicts possible outcomes and potential remedy steps and therefore forms personal 
and SOC team cyber SA. This information is then presented to the customers’ 
personnel responsible for their IT environment decision making. With this received 
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information and with the current situation in the hospital environment, the customer 
representative forms their own cyber SA.  
Based on the author’s own experience, the conclusion from this is that the SIEM 
system and SIEM use case outputs should be mainly targeted towards the SOC 
analyst and people responsible for the maintenance of technical systems. In addition, 
SOC analysts should understand the chain of events behind the SIEM use case to be 
able to form a better SA. Importantly SOC analyst should understand and be aware of 
the potential blind spots in detection capabilities.  
When working with and developing SIEM system use cases security specialists and 
analysts can benefit from the knowledge of Cyber SA and the different levels of it.  
3.4 SIEM system use case creation models 
As established in previous chapters, well planned SIEM use cases make the basis for 
SIEM system usage and provide benefits from the system in creating Cyber SA. In 
previous research and publications found on the topic, few different models were 
found describing the methods to be used in SIEM deployment and in developing 
SIEM use cases. 
Initial SIEM use cases should be valuable and yet achievable in order to get the SIEM 
work started and prove SIEM system’s effectiveness early on. SIEM use cases that 
provide the best value for organization depend on the organization’s risk 
management, threats and business priorities; hence, they need to be defined 
independently for each organization and environment although many similarities 
may exist between organizations. (Chuvakin et al. 2018, 20) 
In a SANS Institute publication “Effective Use Case Modeling for Security Information 
& Event Management” by Daniel Frye (2010, 9-15), the author suggests a Top-Down 
Bottom-Up Middle-Out (TDBUMO) design process to be used in developing SIEM use 
cases.  
The Top-Down part of the method describes how the data will flow in to the SIEM 
system by grouping the data sources based on different categories e.g. operating 
system version and log collection method (Frye 2010, 9-15).  
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The Bottom-Up part of the model describes methods to find out which data points 
each log type includes. These data points are used to recognize correlations between 
the log sources and how the characteristics of each log source should be catalogued.  
The Middle Out phase describes how to tie data points gathered in Bottom Up phase 
to SIEM use cases across the different systems found in the environment. Frye (2010, 
9-15) suggests that the starting point of SIEM use case development should be asking 
the question “What is important to maintain a profitable business model and to 
reduce the risk to that model?”  Frye (ibid.) also proposes to categorize all use cases 
with the CIA triad (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability), as all of these could 
cause significant business risk. 
Frye (2010, 7-8) also highlight the importance of understanding the difference 
between a business use case and a SIEM system use case. Business use case 
describes a general business requirement and SIEM use case describes the actual 
technology used in the SIEM system to achieve the requirements set in the business 
use case e.g. “Identify failed logins” is a business use case that needs to be defined 
more precisely to form a SIEM use case.  
Chuvakin et al. (2018, 31-32) describe the Output driven SIEM method to be used in 
SIEM system design and operation. This model is based on the concept that logs can 
be collected only after log information usage in SIEM system has been defined, i.e. 
SIEM use cases are defined before the log collection is configured. The output driven 
SIEM method is illustrated in Figure 6. (Chuvaking et al. 2018); this pre-planned SIEM 
use case can include reports, visualization, alerts, dashboards or profiling algorithm. 
By using this approach, the SIEM system analyses only the data that is utilized and 
thus avoids the common problem of having masses of data in a SIEM system without 
any insight gained from it. Using this model makes a distinction between a SIEM 
system and broad-scope log management which is used just to collect the logs and 
not to provide security insights from it.  
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Figure 6. Output driven SIEM 
Chuvaking et al. (2018, 32) raised the concern that if output driven SIEM deployment 
is not followed and “just collect it for now and figure out what to do with it later” 
method is used, the SIEM deployment could be stuck in this stage for years without 
providing any real value for the organization.  
3.5 SIEM use case creation and deployment issues 
Many sources have stated and recognized problems in SIEM system deployment, use 
case creation, implementation and continuous development. Hohner (2019) stated 
that many SIEM projects face challenges because they do not have clear focus on 
project goals, no structure during use case creation and no control over involved 
stakeholders. 
As a remediation Hohner (2019) stated that SIEM project should initially focus on 
aiming at quick wins, use risk-based approach and include business requirements at 
decision making. To make use cases more effective stakeholders should be involved 
in SIEM use case creation, e.g. application owners who understand how the 
application or information system operates and how it affects organization’s 
business goals can be stakeholders.  
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Chuvakin, Belak and Barros (2018) state that SIEM implementations fail to deliver full 
value because of broken practices in use case scoping, readiness and design. They 
also stated the following:  
Technical professionals are often surprised that simply acquiring 
and installing a SIEM product does not automatically improve the 
organization’s threat detection and security posture. 
This statement by Chuvakin et al. (2018) also supports the author’s experiences with 
the topic, as the real work to provide value starts after finishing the initial 
deployment, and the ability to start monitoring the environment with the means of 
logs is achieved.  
Chuvakin et al. (2018) suggest that SIEM deployment should be implemented in small 
continuous deployment steps to deliver value sooner and with less risk of getting 
stuck in technical and organizational prerequisites.  
According to Vasudevan (n.d. 3), most organizations rely on the SIEM vendor 
provided default rules, although it is unclear that this approach provides monitoring 
for the specific risks the organization is facing and should be watching for. He also 
summarizes that security monitoring is primarily dependent on the quality of the use 
cases (Vasudevan n.d. 14). 
According to Frye (2010, 14), underfunding SIEM deployment is detrimental and to 
avoid this he proposes to create a strong partnership with the individual business 
units as it is their information that is being protected with the SIEM system. 
Because of the complex problem to be solved, many sources state on the importance 
of starting from small and useful SIEM use cases to deliver results quickly and to let 
the organization learn as the work goes on. This applies to both the security specialist 
and customer organizations’ IT management. Additionally, ensuring stakeholders and 
business units dedication and involvement in to the SIEM deployment seem to be 
highly recognized concern. 
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4 Cyber security kill chain models and frameworks 
4.1 Cyber security Kill Chain & APT 
As the information technology and computer systems have developed, also threats 
and threat actors being directed to them have evolved. Particularly capable threat 
actors are referred to as Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). These APTs have 
substantial resources with the intent to compromise data for economic or military 
advancement. Typically, they are backed up by nation-states and normally, attacks by 
APTs include exploiting multiple systems and vulnerabilities along the attack path 
starting from the internet facing systems and advancing towards the target system 
and asset. As APTs have substantial resources, they try to develop their operations 
and perform intrusion after intrusion to reach their objective. (Pols 2017, 8-9; 
Hutchins, Cloppert &Amin 2010, 2-3) 
The term kill chain has been used in a military context before it was introduced in the 
realm of cyber security by computer scientists at Lockheed Martin in 2010. Cyber 
security kill chain aims to describe the structure of the intrusion by APT actor, and it 
can be used by the defender to develop mitigations against intruders and prioritize 
investments in technology and processes.  (Hutchins et al. 2010, 2) 
In the original cyber security kill chain paper published by Lockheed Martin, the 
authors proposed an intelligence-driven and threat-focused risk management 
strategy, where analyzing intrusions from the attacker’s point of view, the defensive 
steps and countermeasures could be determined and deployed faster than the 
adversaries could evolve their operation. In this model the assumption is that just 
one mitigation is enough to break an attackers’ chain of actions and prevent the 
adversary from reaching their objective. (Pols 2017, 18; Hutchins et al. 2010, 3) 
The kill chain model is based on the concept of indicators, i.e. information that 
objectively describes an intrusion. These indicators can be divided into three 
subtypes which are Atomic, Computed and Behavioral. Atomic indicators are the 
smallest forms of indicators and they cannot be broken down into smaller parts, e.g. 
IP addresses, email addresses and vulnerability information. Computed indicators 
most commonly include hash values that are computed from incident data, e.g. 
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malware executable file hash. Behavioral indicators combine other indicators 
together, e.g. IP address of the destination server where a user has downloaded a 
malicious file combined with hash of that file and timestamp of this event. Attention 
should be paid to processing and tracking indicators throughout their life cycle so 
that the analysts do not find themselves applying these techniques to threat actors 
for which they were not designed. This indicator life cycle and its states are 
presented in Figure 7. (Hutchins et al. 2010, 3-4). 
SIEM system is used to find out these indicators of compromises (IOC) from the 
masses of data gathered from the information sources.  
 
Figure 7. Indicator life cycle 
Original Cyber security kill chain consists of seven (7) phases representing attacker 
objectives for computer network attack to be successful. Computer scientists at 
Lockheed Martin described the phases of the computer network attack kill chain as 
follows (Hutchins et al. 2010, 4-5): 
1. Reconnaissance - Research, identification and selection of targets, often 
represented as crawling Internet websites such as conference 
proceedings and mailing lists for email addresses, social relationships, or 
information on specific technologies. 
2. Weaponization - Coupling a remote access trojan with an exploit into a 
deliverable payload, typically by means of an automated tool 
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(weaponizer). Increasingly, client application data files such as Adobe 
Portable Document Format (PDF) or Microsoft Office documents serve as 
the weaponized deliverable. 
3. Delivery - Transmission of the weapon to the targeted environment. The 
three most prevalent delivery vectors for weaponized payloads by APT 
actors, as observed by the Lockheed Martin Computer Incident Response 
Team (LM-CIRT) for the years 2004-2010, are email attachments, 
websites, and USB removable media. 
4. Exploitation - After the weapon is delivered to victim host, exploitation 
triggers intruders' code. Most often, exploitation targets an application 
or operating system vulnerability, but it could also more simply exploit 
the users themselves or leverage an operating system feature that auto-
executes code. 
5. Installation - Installation of a remote access trojan or backdoor on the 
victim system allows the adversary to maintain persistence inside the 
environment. 
6. Command and Control (C2) - Typically, compromised hosts must beacon 
outbound to an Internet controller server to establish a C2 channel. APT 
malware especially requires manual interaction rather than conduct 
activity automatically. Once the C2 channel establishes, intruders have 
hands on the keyboard" access inside the target environment. 
7. Actions on Objectives - Only now, after progressing through the first six 
phases, can intruders take actions to achieve their original objectives. 
Typically, this objective is data exfiltration which involves collecting, 
encrypting and extracting information from the victim environment; 
violations of data integrity or availability are potential objectives as well. 
Alternatively, the intruders may only desire access to the initial victim 
box for use as a hop point to compromise additional systems and move 
laterally inside the network. 
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For the defender to fully benefit from utilizing the methods depicted in the cyber 
security kill chain paper, the defender should utilize intrusion reconstruction and 
campaign analysis to find out the adversary’s previous steps after determining that 
an intrusion has taken place. After this it is possible to develop new detection 
methods that can be used to detect and mitigate future intrusions in earlier phases 
of CKC. Equally important is to do analysis on the unsuccessful and mitigated attacks 
and this way try to gain insight into what the adversary’s objectives are and what 
might have happened if this attack could have been successful. (Hutchins et al. 2010, 
6-7) 
Detection techniques described previously can be SIEM use cases, which are used to 
detect the known indicators acquired by intrusion reconstruction methods. This way 
it is possible to try to defend also against zero-day threats by detecting indicators of 
adversary actions around the vulnerable software component or system.  
4.2 Additional cyber security kill chain models and adaptation 
4.2.1 Bryant kill chain 
In their paper Bryant and Saiedian (2017) introduced a novel kill chain model named 
Bryant kill chain that is based on the original CKC by Lockheed Martin. In the Bryant 
kill chain some phases were omitted; the sequence was changed, and two new 
phases were introduced and a model with seven (7) phases was defined as presented 
in Figure 8. (Pols 2017, 22; Bryant & Saiedian 2017, 199-200)  
 
Figure 8. Bryant kill chain 
In Bryant’s kill chain paper (Bryant et.al. 2017, 201-205), the methods and 
procedures were introduced to apply the Bryant’s kill chain model to network 
forensics and SIEM system data correlation and aggregation. By leveraging the Bryant 
kill chain model to lessons learned analysis of security breach, the analyst provided 
more through data compared to their peers implementing investigations using ad-
hoc analytical methods. This paper provided indications that a kill chain model could 
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be utilized as an intermediate tool to communicate between the SOC analysts and 
security specialists to help further develop SIEM use cases. 
4.2.2 Unified kill chain 
In Paul Pols’s (2017, 67-72) thesis The Unified Kill Chain (UKC) he analyzed the 
original CKC, multiple CKC variants and Mitre ATT&CK patterns as a literature study, 
performed analysis of multiple red team case studies and analysis on one APT group 
tactics to form the UKC model. This UKC model consists of 18 phases and therefore it 
expands on the granularity offered, compared to the many other CKC models 
consisting of 7 phases.  
Pols (2017, 79) proposed that the UKC could prove useful in raising the resilience of 
organizations against other APT cyber attacks such as modern ransomware worms 
e.g. WannaCry, NotPetya and BadRabbit. The tactics implemented by these 
ransomware worms have been previously seen in targeted attacks and the tactics 
such as pivoting, privilege escalation and lateral movement, which among others 
were also identified in the attacks conducted by APT28 group.  
4.2.3 Problems and limitations in cyber security kill chain models 
In the Unified kill chain paper by Paul Pols (2017, 8; 79) the author states that the 
original CKC by Lockheed Martin relies on untested assumptions in describing the 
modus operandi (M.O.) of APTs. Original CKC guides to focus the defenders’ efforts 
to disrupting and detecting the APT attacks at the earliest phase.  Furthermore, the 
proposition that APT attack can be stopped by disrupting one of the phases in this 
chain of events was discovered to be false as attack phases can be bypassed. By 
bypassing the attack phase, the attacker may also bypass the security control or 
monitoring applying specifically to that phase. 
Patrick Reidy (2013) stated that “The Intrusion Kill Chain is excellent for attacks, but 
doesn’t exactly work for insider threats”. This suggest that CKC cannot be used to 
defend against every types of threats. 
Pols (2017, 79) suggests that realigning the defense strategy to the phases occurring 
more frequently or to the phases that are vital for the attack path to be successful. 
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Preventing the compromise of every single internet connected system in a large 
network is challenging, and it may be more effective to choose a strategy that 
focuses on defending the limited amount of critical supporting assets. 
4.2.4 Cyber security kill chain usage with SIEM use cases 
By assigning a CKC phase to each SIEM use case the whole intrusion can be 
understood better by the SOC analyst and this way improve the perceived cyber SA, 
and the SOC analyst can project the possible outcomes more precisely and faster. 
This CKC phase can be utilized when reviewing the overall visibility achieved with the 
implemented SIEM use cases and when planning for next steps in the SIEM use case 
roadmap.  
5 SIEM use case management model 
5.1 Target environment and description of observed problems 
This chapter describes the environment where SIEM systems are deployed, the end 
customer organizations and the problems recognized while providing the SIEM 
system service and during the previous SIEM system deployments. The problems 
recognized and described here are based on the author’s personal observations and 
free form interviews with the security specialists working with SIEM systems. 
As part of the Managed Security Services Provider (MSSP) security services portfolio 
is a technical situational awareness service. This service is aiming to create and 
maintain cyber SA by monitoring the customers’ environments with the means of 
different technical systems, different internal and external information sources and 
threat intelligence sources. SIEM system is an integral tool to be used in the creation 
of this cyber SA.  
Typical customers of this technical situational awareness service are Finnish hospital 
districts, cities and public sector organization’s. Each customer has their own 
multivendor IT environment including workstations, servers and networks. Each 
customer has multiple information systems specific to their environment, e.g. 
hospital patient information system or work scheduling system for city employees. 
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A SIEM system receives information and events in multiple formats from multiple 
systems and by the means of alerts, dashboards and reports the SIEM system helps 
SOC security analysts in forming the different levels of cyber SA for each of the 
customer’s environments. For the security analyst it is impossible to know all the 
differences and potential weaknesses in detection capabilities or security 
architecture of each customer environment. Therefore, the outputs of the SIEM 
system (alerts, dashboards and reports) should provide the necessary information 
needed in cyber SA creation and integration to business goals and risks. 
The SIEM use case acts as a tool in describing these information requirements, the 
outputs it provides, and how it is meant to contribute to the cyber SA. During this 
thesis process the term SIEM use case has been introduced to the workflow and 
conversations. This adoption was started by the security specialists working directly 
with SIEM system development, and then it started slowly to spread into use of other 
security specialists, sales personnel and customer IT management. 
During previous SIEM deployments the problems observed included inaccurate 
project scope definition regarding the value provided by the SIEM system. This has 
been recognized to be mainly caused by the focus being on the log source selection 
and log management function instead of the initial SIEM use case selection and 
definition; e.g. SIEM projects have had log sources defined without predetermined 
usage for each log source, which has led to inefficient SIEM resource usage in 
compute and personnel areas.  
Another important observation is that customer IT threat and risk management has 
not been fully matured to provide adequate feedback and guidance for SIEM 
deployments and SIEM use case creation and selection. This means that customer IT 
management is not fully aware of the threats that pose the greatest risk for the 
organizations’ IT environment. This leads to the problem of not knowing where 
security monitoring should be targeted and what the most important information 
systems are to focus on. Customer IT management involvement in SIEM deployment 
has proven to be difficult due to an unconstructed and log source focused 
deployment strategy.  
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These realizations are the most important drivers for this thesis and call for a more 
structured way of choosing, managing and developing SIEM use cases for these 
customer environments.  
5.2 Description of the proposed construct 
The following SIEM use case management model was developed for this thesis. It 
consists of a SIEM use case lifecycle combined with a process flow describing the 
actions taking place in each phase of the lifecycle and supporting SIEM use case 
management tools to be used as a use case library and in creating novel SIEM use 
cases. This proposed management model aims to raise the maturity level of SIEM 
system utilization and implementation.  
As stated in multiple literature references concerning utilization of SIEM use cases in 
designing and managing the SIEM deployment, they allow efficient use of compute 
and personnel resources. This approach also helps to deliver results quicker; hence, a 
use case-based method to develop the SIEM system is chosen. Utilizing SIEM use 
cases allows to focus security monitoring on those key target areas set by the 
business threat and risk management processes. Output driven SIEM method was 
chosen to be utilized as a guiding principle in connecting SIEM information sources. 
This requires that the SIEM use case must be defined before the log source can start 
sending logs to the SIEM system. Output driven SIEM incorporated with applicable 
methods from TDBUMO method is utilized to help in developing and choosing the 
SIEM use cases. 
When an organization’s threat and risk management information is not available or it 
is lacking in detail, the security specialists must use their own expertise and 
knowledge about the threats and the environment to direct the SIEM use case 
development. This approach has the risk of the SIEM system focus to be guided in a 
direction that does not align with the customer expectations. With the introduction 
of the SIEM use case concept and the proposed SIEM use case management model, 
communication with the customer’s IT management is expected to be improved. 
In the proposed construct the Bryant kill chain was chosen to be utilized in 
categorizing the SIEM use cases. With the modifications in the Bryant kill chain, it 
provides better categorization of the indicators provided by the SIEM system than 
28 
 
 
the original CKC model. The 18 phases included in the UKC model were deemed to be 
too granular for the intended usage, and the UKC would make the visualization 
creation and usage cumbersome, although the UKC provided a way to abstract the 
attacks further and more accurately. 
5.2.1 SIEM use case lifecycle 
To make the management of multiple SIEM use cases by multiple security specialists 
more efficient, a SIEM use case lifecycle was defined. This lifecycle includes 7 phases 
and each SIEM use case is in one of these phases throughout its lifespan. Each 
lifecycle phase has its own functions and defined tasks that are presented in the 
following chapter. 
By utilizing SIEM use case lifecycle security specialists can manage a larger amount of 
use cases and it allows to utilize applicable use cases in multiple customer 
environments. When presenting SIEM system capabilities with the means of SIEM 
use cases, the lifecycle status can be used as a filtering item. 
To track and manage a SIEM use case throughout its lifecycle the following seven (7) 
phases were defined: 
1. Review needed 
2. Idea Refinement 
3. Development 
4. Testing 
5. Production 
6. Maintenance needed 
7. Discarded 
Lifecycle phase functions and tasks are presented in the following chapter together 
with the detailed SIEM use case management process. 
5.2.2 SIEM use case management process 
SIEM use case management process defines the detailed actions and decision points 
inside each lifecycle phase. These actions and decision points are presented in detail 
in this chapter.  
In the review needed phase, a new SIEM use case idea is recorded and an initial 
feasibility review is made. New SIEM use case ideas can be suggested by any 
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personnel related to the environments’ cyber security monitoring on MSSP or 
customer side regardless of their role. Review needed (1.) phase is presented in 
Figure 9 together with idea refinement (2.) phase.  
The methods to collect new SIEM use case ideas can vary from post-it notes on a 
whiteboard to an Excel spreadsheet to a ticketing system depending on tools 
otherwise utilized by the team responsible for SIEM development. To get the 
customer involved in the SIEM use case selection and development, a regular review 
of the SIEM use case library with the customer’s IT management is recommended. 
Initial use case feasibility should be reviewed by multiple professionals to ensure a 
review from multiple viewpoints and thus enhance prioritization and resource usage 
in the later phases. If a use case is deemed implausible for any reason, it can be 
discarded at this phase.  
In the idea refinement phase, each use case idea is worked on by the security 
specialists to include the necessary information for use case review and scoring 
during this phase. After this phase the SIEM use case must include at least the 
following preliminary information: use case name and description, kill-chain phase, 
information needs (log source or other information sources) and operation mode 
(alert, dashboard or report). The description needs to be accurate enough for the 
security specialist to be able to form an initial draft of the use case operation logic, 
and information needs are needed for estimating the work effort needed to have 
that information available in SIEM system, e.g. when the log format is supported by 
the SIEM system and the normalization is readily available, the work effort is much 
smaller than if it is necessary to write one’s own normalization policy.  
In use case review & scoring step each SIEM use case is reviewed for implementation 
feasibility and effort needed to develop (later referred as Effort) and potential gains 
expected (later referred as Benefit) when use case is working. In this step effort and 
benefit get values assigned ranging from 1 to 5, and these values are multiplied 
together to get the priority value. For effort value 1 means that the information 
needed for the use case is not readily available in SIEM system and the operation 
logic needs plenty of work, value 5 means that information is readily available in 
SIEM system and operation logic uses simple search operations. For benefit value 1 
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means that the use case is producing only statistical value or anticipated false 
positive rate is high and value 5 means that the use case will produce output that can 
be acted upon immediately and it has low false positive rate. SIEM use case 
prioritization can be used to guide work resource usage during development stage. 
SIEM use case can be discarded at this phase. 
 
Figure 9. Development of SIEM use case phases 1 and 2 
The development phase includes the main development effort of SIEM use case. It 
starts by selecting the use case from the prioritized backlog and then planning and 
defining the SIEM use case objective, the threat it responds to, the stakeholders 
related to the use case and information requirements. The next step is to define how 
the use case operation logic is formed, i.e. use case operation logic defines if it is 
displaying its output as alert, dashboard or report or any combination of these and 
what kind of search queries and other techniques are needed to provide the desired 
output. These definitions form the basis on how SIEM use case relates to cyber SA 
and how its output can be used to provide enhanced perception, comprehension and 
projection (SA levels 1-3).  
Based on the previous steps, a prototype of the use case is created, and it is 
evaluated whether it is ready for the testing phase. If not, then another development 
round is needed. This creates the main development cycle and the use case iterates 
in it until it is ready for production testing. Figure 10 presents the steps and actions in 
the development (3.) and testing (4.) phases. 
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In the testing phase SIEM use case is run in the production environment to see how it 
operates and whether the generated output is adequate, and the use case responds 
to the threat defined in earlier steps. In “Use Case false positive & alert rate review 
period” step the SIEM use case is run in the production or test environment to find 
out how many indications it produces and what the amount of false positive 
indications is. In “Use case threshold tuning” step search query and alert thresholds 
are tuned according to the observations made in the previous step.  
The final step before the use case is ready to be deployed in production is the 
playbook creation. In this step a playbook is created that aims to define the 
procedures for the SOC analyst to follow when a SIEM use case is triggered in 
production, e.g. a playbook could define the steps that SOC analyst can take to 
exclude false positive findings and the first steps to do to start mitigating the threat. 
This SIEM use case specific playbook should be linked to the SOC documentation and 
to other SOC processes, e.g. incident management process. Dependencies to other 
teams should be recognized and described at this stage.  One of the most important 
objectives for the SIEM use cases is to provide actionable outputs that help in 
creating the cyber SA and to provide good starting information for incident 
management process. 
Actions and techniques used during the testing phase depend on the type of use case 
logic and output (Alert, Report or Dashboard). When these steps are completed, the 
SIEM use case is ready for production usage and its phase is changed to production 
(5.). 
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Figure 10. Development of SIEM use case phases 3 and 4 
When the SIEM use case is in the production (5.) phase and a need for a change 
arises, the change need is reviewed by the SOC analysts and security specialists to 
determine if it is a matter of threshold tuning or if there is need for a major change. 
In the case of tuning needed, the adjustments to the thresholds or small tuning to 
the operation logic can be made to provide a better output. These tuning operations 
can be made during the production phase. Figure 11 presents the steps in Production 
(5.) and Maintenance (6.) needed phases. 
In the case of a more major change need, the phase of SIEM use case is changed to 
“Maintenance needed” (6.). In this phase the SIEM use case is reviewed if it still is 
relevant, if it responds to the threat described in the SIEM use case and if it provides 
the desired output. The SIEM use case can be discarded at this stage if it is deemed 
irrelevant or outdated. If the SIEM use case change need recognized is something 
deemed fixable, the SIEM use case is prioritized and put back into the development 
backlog, e.g. the log format of the log source utilized in the SIEM use case has 
changed and therefore operation logic needs to be revised to take this change into 
account. 
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Figure 11. Development of SIEM use case phases 5 and 6 
If the SIEM use case is discarded, its status is changed to discarded but it is kept in 
the use case library, so it can be found and referenced later.  
New use case ideas could be handled during a weekly use case review meeting, 
where new ideas, prioritization of use cases and task selection for the next 
development cycle is done. 
5.2.3 SIEM use case information fields and use case library  
During their lifecycle SIEM use cases are organized by utilizing the structure 
presented in Table 1 including a short explanation of each data field. Together these 
form a use case library used to document each use case. This SIEM use case library 
helps in utilizing use cases with different customer environments and in forming 
other use case ideas. A use case library in its simplest form can be an Excel 
spreadsheet with use case information fields as column headers and use cases as 
rows as shown in Appendix 1, data in Appendix 1. SIEM use case library is created for 
illustration purposes. 
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Table 1. Use Case structure 
Use Case Name Short descriptive name, ties use cases to 
alerts, dashboards and reports 
Description Longer description about the use case and its 
objectives 
Bryant kill chain phase Bryant kill chain phase associated with use 
case. 
<selection of fields described below> 
Bryant kill chain sub phase Bryant kill chain sub phase associated with use 
case. <selection of fields described below> 
Priority This value is used to prioritize use cases in 
development stage within each customer 
(multiplication of benefit and effort) 
Benefit of the use case Numeral estimate of the potential use case 
benefit. (1 minimal benefit – 5 straight and 
actionable indication of anomaly) 
Effort needed to develop Numeral estimate of the effort needed to 
develop use case logic and getting the logs. (1= 
Development estimated to be hard and needs 
plenty of work, or log source is hard to connect 
to SIEM – 5= log data already in SIEM system 
and logic easy to develop) 
Customer List of customers utilizing the use case 
Lifecycle phase Use case lifecycle phase is used to manage use 
cases in different stages. 
<selection of fields described in SIEM use case 
lifecycle chapter> 
Technologies involved List of technologies involved to be used in 
visual or textual representation of use case 
library 
Log sources list of log source needs used to aid in log 
source management 
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Following values can be selected in Bryant kill chain phases and sub phases; these are 
the same fields as described in chapter 4.2.1 Bryant kill chain. 
Bryan kill chain phases are as follows: 
• Network phase (Pre hack) 
• Endpoint phase (Hack) 
• Domain phase (Compromise) 
• Egress phase (Theft) 
• Other 
Bryant kill chain sub phases are listed below: 
• Reconnaissance 
• Delivery 
• Installation 
• Privilege escalation 
• Lateral Movement 
• Actions on Objective 
• Exfiltration 
• Other 
5.2.4 Methods for SIEM use case creation 
Previous research found during the information acquisition for this thesis provided 
only little information on the methods and tools to be used in the SIEM use case 
creation and few sources stated broader models describing the overall SIEM 
deployment.  
To allow new SIEM use case ideas to be found and developed in a more structured 
way, a few different types of SIEM use case workshops were recognized. These 
workshop types are overall monitoring capability review, system specific attack 
workshop and system specific threat and risk management workshop. In these 
workshops the customer IT management and stakeholders need to be present as 
increasing the understanding of the SIEM system capabilities and tying it to 
organizations threat and risk management are major objectives in addition to 
creating new SIEM use cases. Further details of the contents and structure for these 
workshops are outside of the scope for this thesis.  
As presented in the original CKC paper, intrusion reconstruction can help in 
determining what indicators are available for detecting adversary actions and to find 
36 
 
 
out more information related to intrusion. Based on the intrusion reconstruction new 
SIEM use case ideas can be worked on to further improve the SIEM system detection 
capabilities. By using the same Bryant kill chain phases in intrusion reconstruction, it 
helps to form better understanding of the threat actor and its objective. 
In the Bottom Up phase of the TDBUMO model, log source data points are mapped 
to find out potential collisions and therefore correlation possibilities. This method 
helps the security specialists to get familiar with the contents of the logs and 
provides faster SIEM use case development as well as improves the quality of the 
indications by correlating information from multiple sources together. This process is 
conflicting with the Output driven SIEM method as SIEM use cases and their 
information needs should be defined before this analysis can be done; nevertheless, 
it can be a valuable task to perform when building more advanced SIEM use cases 
that utilize information correlation between information sources. Bryant suggested a 
similar process to map the information provided by the log sources to the applicable 
Bryant kill chain phase and to find out potential data pairings for correlation (Bryant 
& Saiedian 2017, 201-205). These methods can be utilized by the security specialists’ 
when developing new SIEM use cases or improving existing SIEM use cases. 
A set of basic SIEM use cases needs to be defined to help in the SIEM system 
deployment and to ease the communication with customer’s IT management 
personnel who necessarily do not have enough knowledge to give input to the SIEM 
use case development before the SIEM system deployment starts. During the 
deployment stage great care must be taken to ensure the customer involvement in 
the security monitoring planning. Continuous development process must be in place 
to ensure that SIEM capability development continues after the initial deployment 
project is finished. 
5.2.5 Visualisation methods 
As described previously, each SIEM use case has the Bryant kill chain phase assigned 
to it. This is done to assist in visualizing the SIEM monitoring capabilities provided by 
the SIEM use cases and to improve the SOC analyst’s understanding of the impending 
situation indicated by the SIEM use case. The SIEM use cases applied to each 
customer can be presented under the Bryant kill chain phases to provide an overall 
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view of the monitoring capabilities in the customer environments as presented in 
Figure 12. This figure shows example SIEM use cases and their kill chain phases, from 
the figure it can be deducted that privilege escalation phase does not have any SIEM 
use cases, and therefore no adversary actions can be detected at this phase. For 
example, creation of this visualization can be achieved automatically by utilizing a 
PowerBI application presenting a high-level view of the SIEM use case information 
retrieved from the SIEM use case library. 
 
Figure 12. Example SIEM use cases presented in Bryant kill chain phases 
The Bryant kill chain can be utilized in the communication of cyber SA to the 
customer IT management and stakeholders, as it helps to provide uniform 
understanding of the impending situation. The security analysts can use the format 
presented in Figure 13 to display the IOC and other information related to the 
incident. It can be utilized during the active incident management or after the 
lessons learned and intrusion reconstruction has been done. In the figure each 
adversary action is mapped to the applicable Bryant kill chain phase. 
 
Figure 13. Example of intrusion events presented on the Bryant kill chain 
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6 Implementation and research results 
6.1 Construct implementation in practice 
During the iterative process of creating the proposed construct, the principles have 
been utilized in practice among the team of security specialists working with SIEM 
system development. This has provided feedback of the construct throughout the 
process. Multiple SIEM use cases have been defined and developed by the team 
members, and use cases are currently in the production phase of SIEM use case 
lifecycle. Supporting tools and practices to help manage the SIEM use case library 
and provide visualizations have been implemented within the team of security 
specialists responsible for SIEM system development. 
Initial deployment to include customer IT management has started for one customer, 
providing feedback and confirmation of proposed constructs suitability for 
communication between the security specialists and customer IT management.  
6.2 Interview execution 
To further understand the results achieved with the proposed construct, a set of 
interviews was held. The interviews were conducted by using theme interviews. Each 
of the interviewees had familiarized themselves with this thesis and the proposed 
construct from their own standpoint as each had their own role in the security 
monitoring. In total two interviews were held, and the results of the interviews are 
summarized and presented in the following chapter.  
Both interviews followed a similar theme, and the structure of the interview was 
based on the structure of this thesis report as the purpose was to verify the 
suitability of the proposed construct and receive feedback on the findings. The first 
interviewee was the author’s colleague working closely with SIEM systems and who 
has been working closely with the proposed construct during its development and 
the other was a security specialist from a customer organization working in the 
security services unit.  
The total duration of both interviews was approximately one hour.  
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6.3 Interview results 
Both interviewees told that Cyber SA theory was not previously familiar, and that the 
thesis provided an understandable description of the concepts. According to one 
interviewee, it was closely related to the topic and it can be utilized to further 
enhance the understanding of the SIEM system position related to the cyber SA 
creation. 
During the interviews it became apparent that the theory section regarding the SIEM 
systems was accurate and gave the basic understanding of the SIEM system. The 
other interviewee mentioned that the description of the difference between a 
business case and a SIEM use case was important thing to bring out as it is often 
mixed up in the vendor white papers. 
When asked about the accuracy of the SIEM deployment problem description, both 
interviewees agreed that the problems are accurate and can be identifiable. 
The other interviewee told that in his opinion the techniques presented in the CKC 
papers can be utilized while working with threats not coming from APT actor and the 
seven phases of the Bryan kill chain are a suitable method for presenting the SIEM 
use cases and the intrusions. 
Both interviewees agreed that the proposed construct provides structure for 
developing SIEM use cases and the SIEM use cases can be propagated to other 
environments more easily. The other interviewee told that while reading the 
construct it felt that this is how it should have always been done, and it made him 
think why this has not been done like this way before.  
Coupling the threat and risk management to SIEM deployments was thought out to 
be an important way to improve SIEM capabilities as then the resources can be 
better directed to the areas important for the organization. By using the visualization 
methods described in the proposed construct the SIEM system capabilities can be 
reviewed and potential blind spots can be identified. 
As a problem one interviewee identified the large amount of work required to 
transform the currently utilized SIEM alerts, dashboard and reports to include SIEM 
use case description as these previously have been implemented by the individual 
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security specialists without all the documentation steps and concepts introduced in 
the proposed construct. 
One interviewee pointed out that to ensure that the SOC analysts understand the 
SIEM use case outputs correctly, the necessary documentation of the monitored 
environment must be available even though the SIEM use case output must be as 
informative as possible. The other interviewee pointed out that it is important for 
the SIEM use cases to be thought out with the specific environment in mind and this 
way improve the SIEM use case outputs and reduce the load on SOC analyst. 
As a summary of the answers given by the interviewees, this thesis subject was 
justified, and the thesis responded to a real problem in the deployment of the SIEM 
systems and provided new knowledge that can be applied to the described field of 
problems.  
6.4 Research results 
This chapter describes how the results achieved with the proposed construct meet 
the requirements set for this thesis and how the research questions were answered. 
The decision to handle SIEM system alerts, dashboards and reports as SIEM use cases 
has improved the efficiency of the SIEM systems development, and it was the first 
step in utilizing the concept of “Output-driven SIEM”. This decision has helped to 
change the mindset from log source first mentality to value-based thinking: how to 
detect adversary actions in the systems and how to provide value by improving the 
cyber SA.  
Initial experiences support the assumption that by transferring the focus from the log 
sources to the SIEM use case selection and development during the SIEM 
deployment, the customer IT management and stakeholders get a better and more 
realistic understanding of the capabilities provided by the SIEM system. Initial 
experiences gathered from the usage of the visualizing techniques presented in the 
proposed construct provided better understanding of the SIEM system capabilities. 
As the deployment of the proposed construct to the customer side was brief, no 
conclusion can be made for the long-term impacts of the proposed constructs 
usability. 
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Based on the experiences during construct development and the interview, it was 
noted that the burden of developing new SIEM use cases can be overwhelming. 
Therefore, the process must be as light as possible; however, it must provide the 
necessary information to form new and effective SIEM use cases. The structure 
provided by the proposed construct enables multiple security specialists to share and 
document their work and this way improve the efficiency of teamwork. Properly 
documented SIEM use cases can be transferred to other customer environments 
with smaller time investment. SIEM use case lifecycle and the process described in 
the proposed construct have provided the means to address this burden and the 
proposed construct seems like a good fit for the employer organization.  
Understanding of the cyber SA in theory will help to develop better SIEM use cases as 
the security specialists can take into account the humane aspects of the SOC 
analysts, i.e. SIEM use case output should indicate clear events and be easily 
interpreted by the SOC analyst consuming the information to form the cyber SA and 
to take actions based on it without overwhelming the SOC analyst with a flood of 
information. During the SOC analysts’ introduction to the SIEM use cases attention 
must be paid to the way the SIEM use case logic is formed and what the outputs of 
the use cases mean. In this way the SOC analyst can weigh the reliability of the 
observation. 
The methods described in the cyber kill chain documents refer to the fact that 
adversaries are APT actors with major resources, and therefore the suggested actions 
are justified. From the standpoint of a Finnish organization or company, the majority 
of cyber security incidents is not caused by APT actors but rather threat actors 
looking for a quick way to monetize the attack and gather user accounts or personal 
information. Regardless of this, techniques such as intrusion reconstruction can be 
beneficial and provide value in creation of SIEM use case to detect similar attacks in 
the future; however, care must be taken to evaluate the effort invested in each of 
the cases. 
During the thesis process it became apparent that the threat and risk management 
information in the organizations has not been the guiding factor in developing the 
SIEM capabilities. It was recognized that the threat and risk management information 
should provide general guidelines for choosing SIEM use cases, and the SIEM use 
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case could be used as a risk mitigation factor by lowering either the probability or 
impact of the risk event. Ensuring the customer IT management, and the 
stakeholders’ commitment and involvement in SIEM use case selection and 
development is vital for successful SIEM deployment. 
Lukka (2001) stated that an inevitable stage in constructive research is that the 
researcher must recognize the theoretical contribution accomplished in the research. 
In this thesis the theoretical contribution is achieved by creating a novel construction 
that utilizes the previously presented methods such as SIEM use case and CKC. 
The proposed construct and the thesis provide methods and tools to use in the SIEM 
capability development, and cyber security kill chain models are utilized as part of 
the solution. This way it can be concluded that the answers to the main research 
questions set in the beginning of the thesis process have been achieved. 
Based on the interview answers and the author’s personal experiences the proposed 
construct meets the requirements set for this thesis by providing the needed 
structure and tools for the SIEM system capability development. The interviews 
provided feedback on the validity and generalization of the thesis subject. 
The risks mentioned in the chapter on research methods have not been actualized, 
and the employer organization has withstood the commitment to this thesis. 
7 Discussion 
This thesis process started with the idea of how to utilize CKC model in the SIEM 
system development and how to make the development work more structured. The 
paper on Bryant kill chain by Bryant & Saiedian (2017) was inspiring in the topic 
selection and provided reassurance that these methods should be investigated more 
deeply. 
During the theory research phase of this thesis it became obvious that the previously 
published research does not cover the SIEM system deployment and the SIEM use 
case management in detail. This realization strengthened the need for this research, 
and more future research remains to be conducted on this subject. 
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Many of the issues faced in this thesis could be solved by automation, data fusion 
and anomaly detection; yet, the human understanding of the cyber SA is vital and 
necessary to present it forward for other levels of decision making, e.g. a hospital’s 
cyber SA affects greatly to the treatment of the patients. 
Based on the author’s understanding it can be said that the most important 
intellectual capital for a MSSP are the contents of the SIEM use case library, and a 
great deal of work should be done to develop SIEM use cases to provide added value. 
Understanding of the problem at hand matured during the thesis, and the objective 
to provide more structure to the SIEM development work was kept in mind 
throughout the thesis process. This thesis supports the work done towards 
implementing and deploying SIEM systems by providing a more structured way of 
managing and developing the SIEM capabilities. A challenging aspect in the chosen 
research topic was the difficulty to separate the general SIEM system development 
tasks of the author’s work role and the thesis objectives. Some ideas and constructs 
were developed and utilized at work; they were, however, left out of this thesis 
report as they were out of the thesis scope. In the end it can be said that these two 
roles supported each other. 
The selected constructive research approach worked well in this thesis and provided 
guidelines on how to proceed with the thesis research process and avoid the 
potential pitfalls. It provided the guidance to the scientific way of reporting and was 
a good fit for problems arising from the working life difficulties. During the thesis 
process the proposed construct was improved in steps while building on the 
knowledge acquired in the theory research conducted for the thesis.  
During the thesis process and with the implementation of the SIEM use case concept 
and the proposed construct, the overall maturity of the SIEM deployments was 
increased; however, without a way to measure the maturity progress of the SIEM 
capability it was impossible to weigh. As a further research objective, a SIEM system 
maturity measurement model would be needed, and it would greatly benefit 
organizations running SIEM systems in choosing the right development activities and 
in achieving more up-to date and relevant SA by utilizing the SIEM system. 
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In the future it would be beneficial to study how one should modify the framework in 
this thesis to best suit the different phases and maturity levels of SIEM customer 
projects and the organization’s environments. As presented in the thesis construct, 
workshops are an integral part of developing new SIEM use cases; therefore, further 
research needs to be conducted to find out how these workshops should be carried 
out and how available threat modelling techniques could be used to improve SIEM 
use case development.  
Thorough testing and wide deployment of the proposed construct to the customer 
environments were not possible during the thesis project due to limited resources 
and timeframe, although initial feedback was received indicating positive results 
from the customer organization. It would have improved the reliability of the results 
and provided a better understanding of the suitability of the proposed construct for 
it be used in other organizations. Further research should be conducted with a wider 
implementation scope and longer observation period. 
While conducting and analyzing the interviews, the author noticed that his own 
experiences and opinions could easily affect the opinions and answers of the 
interviewees. A small number of interviewees was a choice forced by the timeframe 
of the thesis. As the researcher conducting the interview has also created the 
proposed construct, it created a biased setting for the interview situation. These 
observations lower the reliability of the interview results. Regardless of these 
observations, the interviews provided a wider perspective of the results achieved 
with the proposed construct and thesis. 
This thesis and the assigned topic were interesting to the author as they are closely 
related to the work role and the proposed construct affects the author’s daily work. 
Personally, this thesis has provided plenty of insights into the SIEM systems and the 
pitfalls related to them. The theory connection presented in this thesis combined to 
the years of work experience in the cyber security field and experiences gathered 
during the implementation phase greatly improve the author’s professional skills and 
at the same time they showed that there are still plenty of aspects to study regarding 
the security monitoring and SIEM systems. 
  
45 
 
 
References 
Bryant, B., & Saiedian H. 2017.  A novel kill-chain framework for remote security log 
analysis with SIEM software. Computers & Security, 67, 198-210. 
Chuvakin, A., 2012. On “Output-driven” SIEM. Blog-post. Accessed 17 October 2019. 
Retrieved from https://blogs.gartner.com/anton-chuvakin/2012/09/24/on-output-
driven-siem/ 
Chuvakin, A., Belak, A., & Barros, A. 2018. How to Architect and Deploy a SIEM 
Solution. Gartner Technical Professional Advice. Gartner ID: G00366351. 
Endsley, M.R. 1995. Toward a Theory of Situation Awareness in Dynamic Systems. 
Human Factors, 37(1), 32-64. 
Frye, D. 2010. Effective Use Case Modeling for Security Information & Event 
Management. SANS reading room whitepaper. Accessed 16 October 2019. Retrieved 
from https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/bestprac/effective-case-
modeling-security-information-event-management-33319  
Hohner, A. 2019. Use cases are a key component of every SIEM. Blog-post. Accessed 
17 October 2019. Retrieved from https://www.capgemini.com/2019/05/how-to-
define-complex-use-cases-and-implement-them-in-your-siem-soc-project/ 
Hutchins, E., Cloppert, M., & Amin, R. 2010. Intelligence-Driven Computer Network 
Defense Informed by Analysis of Adversary Campaigns and Intrusion Kill Chains. 
Lockheed Martin Corporation. Accessed 10 of August 2019. Retrieved from 
https://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed-
martin/rms/documents/cyber/LM-White-Paper-Intel-Driven-Defense.pdf 
Hyötyläinen, R., Häkkinen, K., & Uusitalo, K. 2014. The constructive approach as a link 
between scientific research and the needs of industry. Accessed 8 of December 2019. 
Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/279183260 
Lukka, K. 2001. Konstruktiivinen tutkimusote [Constructive scientific 
researchapproach]. www.metodix.com. Referred from 
https://metodix.fi/2014/05/19/lukka-konstruktiivinen-tutkimusote/ 
Logpoint. 2018. Logpoint administrator training material. Powerpoint presentation.  
Lötjönen, J. 2017. Requirement specification for cyber security situational awareness: 
Defender's approach in cyber security exercises. Master’s thesis. JAMK University of 
Applied Sciences, School of Technology, Master’s Degree Programme in Information 
Technology. Accessed 12 October 2019. Retrieved from 
http://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi:amk-2017121320954 
Miller, D., Harris, S., Harper, A., Vandyke, S., & Blask, C. 2011. Security Information 
and Event Management (SIEM) Implementation. McGraw-Hill/Osborne. 
Onwubiko, C. 2016. Understanding Cyber Situation Awareness. International Journal 
on Cyber Situational Awareness, Vol. 1, No. 1, 11-30. 
46 
 
 
Pols, P. 2017. The Unified Kill Chain: Designing a Unified Kill Chain for analyzing, 
comparing and defending against cyber attacks. Cyber Security Academy. Accessed 
on 15 October 2019. Retrieved from 
https://www.csacademy.nl/images/scripties/2018/Paul-Pols---The-Unified-Kill-
Chain.pdf 
Puustinen, S. 2013. Qualitative research and theme interview as a method of 
collecting data. Aalto University. Accessed on 21 March 2020. Retrieved from 
https://mycourses.aalto.fi/pluginfile.php/195681/mod_resource/content/1/qualitati
ve%20research%202013-10-28_handout.pdf 
Reidy, P. 2013. Combating the Insider Threat at the FBI. Presentation at Black Hat 
USA 2013. Accessed on 10 December 2019. Retrieved from 
https://media.blackhat.com/us-13/US-13-Reidy-Combating-the-Insider-Threat-At-
The-FBI-Slides.pdf. 
Shoard, P. 2018. Hype Cycle for Threat-Facing Technologies, 2018. Gartner. Accessed 
on 13 September 2019. Retrieved from 
https://www.gartner.com/en/documents/3882466/hype-cycle-for-threat-facing-
technologies-2018. 
Symantec. 2019. Internet Security Threat Report 2019. Accessed on 11 December 
2019. Retrieved from https://www.symantec.com/security-center/threat-report 
Vasudevan, V. n.d. A Framework for Business Aligned Security Monitoring Use Cases. 
Whitepaper. Accessed on 19 October 2019. Retrieved from 
https://www.paladion.net/hubfs/Whitepaper%20PDF/A_Framework_for_Business_
Aligned_Security_Monitoring_Use_Cases.pdf 
  
47 
 
 
Appendices 
Appendix 1. Example of SIEM use library and use cases. 
# Use Case 
Description 
(Objective) 
Lifecycle 
p
h
ase
 Sub-phase 
P
rio
 
B
en
efit  
Effo
rt 
C
u
st. 
Log sources, 
technology 
1 
Crypto locker 
activity detected in 
network share 
Detect and alert 
when suspicious 
amount of writes and 
reads are performed. 5. 
Actions on 
Objective 12 4 3 
Cust 
1. file server 
2 
New vulnerability 
found in critical 
server 
Compare and alert 
when new 
vulnerabilities have 
beend found in 
critical services 4.  10 2 5 
Cust 
1. Nessus 
3 
Malware detected 
in server 
Alert when AV 
detected new 
malware infection in 
server. 3. Installation 16 4 4 
Cust 
1. & 
cust 2 
Fsecure policy 
manager 
4 
Malware detected 
in workstation 
Alert when AV 
detected new 
malware infection in 
workstation. 3. Installation 16 4 4 
Cust 
1.  
& 
Cust 
2 
Fsecure policy 
manager 
 
 
 
 
 
 
